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Are shadows transparent? An investigation 
on white, shadows and transparency in pictures
Roberto Casati
Institut Jean Nicod CNRS EHESS-ENS, Paris, and Università IUAV, Venice
Abstract :  Shadow perception and transparency perception appear to use very similar 
rules, to the point that from the perceptual point of view shadows have been considered an 
instance of transparent objects. We claim that in spite of the similarities, shadows ought not 
to be considered transparent entities. The discussion has consequences both for the issue of 
the location of  shadows,  and for  the  conceptualization of  transparency,  and it  provides 
insight into the inner complexities of the conceptual structure of visual concepts.
Keywords:  shadow  perception;  transparency  perception;  pictorial  
representation
“No  black,  no  white  is  transparent”/“Nessun  bianco  o  nero  è 
trasparente” (Leonardo da Vinci, Scritti Scelti, ed. M. Brizio, Turin 1962, p. 
417, f. 23 verso)
An accurate description of how cast shadows look like is a relatively 
difficult phenomenological endeavor. Cast shadows have a shape – although 
oftentimes a blurred one; but do they have a color, and if so, what is their 
color? The same could be asked for their location. Are they in the surface 
they  are  cast  upon,  or  are  they  somewhat  above  it,  in  the  way  a  thin 
superposed film-like layer could be? Looking for a method for answering 
these at first sight exceedingly marginal questions can be useful in order to 
investigate some of the preferences and operations of the conceptual system. 
We would then be able to move to more general questions, such as what is 
for the concept of a physical entity to leave the possibility open that the 
entity’s location is only partly specified. Given the intrinsically visual nature 
of shadows, this inquiry has to take into account some constraints derived 
from the architecture of the visual system. In this paper I’ll pursue the issue 
of the location of shadows by testing it against the visual phenomenon of 
transparency, for two reasons: rules for shadow perception as close kins of 
rules  for  transparency  perception,  and  transparency  imposes  three-
dimensional ordering: if shadows are transparent, then their location would 
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be  specificed  unambiguously.  Questions  to  be  discussed  here  are  thus 
whether  shadows  are  transparent;  whether  they  have  three-dimensional 
ordering; or whether white can be transparent. 
The visual nature of shadows
An object’s reflectance measures the proportion of incident light that is 
reflected by the object’s surface. An object’s luminance measures the light 
reflected by the object that travels to and is measured by the eyes of the 
observer.  Shadows  affect  illumination,  that  is,  the  quantity  of  light  that 
reaches the object, and hence affect luminance, which is simply the product 
of the illumination by the reflectance. 
Shadows  are  physical  entities,  but  among  physical  entities  they  are 
peculiar, insofar as they are not material. They are located in space without 
occupying the space they are located at. Above all, shadows have intriguing 
visual properties. The concept of a shadow is partly a visual, and partly a 
causal concept (shadows are the result of a blocking action by an obtruder 
on incident light). There are visual shapes and tactile shapes; a square can be 
such for the sight and for the touch; but there are only visual shadows (bar 
some inconsequent metaphors). Furthermore, the concept of a shadow is the 
concept  of something with a visual boundary (Casati  2000).  Even if  the 
physical conditions for casting a shadow are present, in the absence of a 
visible boundary one is not prepared to accept that a shadow is there. The 
night is the shadow of the Earth, but it is not conceptualized, let alone seen 
as a shadow, precisely as it lacks a visual boundary, except perhaps when a 
Moon eclipse is observed. And indeed, the visual system deploys quite a lot 
of  ingenuity  in  chasing  after  shadow  boundaries,  in  particular  in 
distinguishing  boundaries  of  reflectance,  such as  the  ones  created at  the 
limit of a green leaf on a white stone, from boundaries of illumination such 
as the ones created by a shadow on the white stone. Mistaking the latter for 
the former would entail taking the ephemeral for the permanent; mistaking 
the former for the latter would entail the opposite mistake. Both mistakes 
can have unwelcome consequences in ecological situations. The ephemeral 
is the mark of a moving object; the permanent is a clue to classification via 
properties of surfaces. Somewhat anecdotally, picture yourself as perceiving 
a portion of the visually striped skin of an animal: is it a zebra or is it a lion 
instead, in the scattered shadow of a palm-tree?
The visual system is somewhat able to discount the effect of shadows 
and to deliver a measure of the invariant property of reflectance. This has 
the consequence that a shadow does not change the perceived color of an 
object:  a  white  stone  upon  which  is  cast  the  shadow of  a  leaf  appears 
uniformly white, in spite of the very large difference in luminance between 
the lit up area and the shaded area. 
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Suppose that you can see the shadows’ boundaries,  thereby noticing 
that  a shadow is  present.  What  are  the features  of these boundaries that 
make  you  perceive  a  shadow?  Not  all  boundaries  will  do.  It  was  long 
thought that blurred boundaries are necessary (Hering 1878): they aren’t, 
although they help, and in spite of the fact that most real shadow boundaries 
are blurred. However, as noticed by Leonardo already, tracing a shadow’s 
outline  destroys  shadow  character.  The  important  fact  is  that  certain 
luminance relations holding between the areas on the opposite sides of the 
boundary must be respected whenever the illumination boundary crosses a 
reflectance boundary. This brings us to transparency, as in transparency too 
the interplay between luminance relations across a boundary are crucial.
Varieties of transparency and pictorial (cyclopean) 
transparency
In  the  environment  there  is  transparency  when  some object  is  seen 
through and behind another object. Being a spatial property related to how 
distant  are  two  objects  from an  observer,  transparency  is  in  most  cases 
assessed binocularly. A transparent layer can be seen over a background; the 
background  is  seen  through  the  transparent  layer.  You  see  the  silver 
boundary of a glass pane and you see that as you move, what is to be seen 
within the boundary changes.  Not  only glass (or  transparent  stuff,  like a 
plastic film) can be seen as transparent in this sense. A canopy, a fence, a 
net,  a  piece  of  fabric,  are  sometimes  usefully  described  as  transparent, 
especially based on what you see when you move relative to them, so that 
the background behind them can be revealed piecemeal. However, binocular 
information and more in general three-dimensional stimuli are not necessary 
to convey the sense of transparency, as it was known to painters for a long 
time. Indeed, when looking at a painting you do not use information that 
need to be retrieved binocularly. Conversely, transparent objects may not be 
sufficient  to  visually  convey  a  sense  of  transparency.  A piece  of  green 
transparent film on a white cardboard can be seen as an opaque green patch. 
Finally, in a painting you have to use an opaque stimulus in order to convey 
a sense of transparency. 
In  a  classical  paper,  Metelli  (1974)  showed  how the  impression  of 
transparency  is  produced  whenever  a  visual  mosaic  obeys  certain 
configuration and lightness  rules.  Importantly,  the  mosaic  is  totally  two-
dimensional,  a  juxtaposition  of  opaque  patches  on  a  surface.  Call  this 
specific, cyclopean sense of transparency pictorial transparency. Note first 
that  the configuration aspects  of  transparency require  the  presence of  x-
junctions, that is, regions of the image where lines cross. This is why the 
green film placed at the center of the white cardboard fails to be seen as 
transparent  –  no  x-junctions  are  involved.  The  surface  that  is  seen  as 
transparent must further be seen as unitary in color, and this can happen in 
some  conditions.  Consider  three  mosaics  as  in  the  following  figure. 
3
Although these are just mosaics, that is,  juxtapositions of opaque tiles, a 
sense of transparency is conveyed in the central region of each.
Fig 1. Some important predictions of the Metelli transparency Rules. Leftmost board: 
white stripe. Middle board: grey stripe. Rightmost board: dark grey stripe. The rules are 
explained in the text.
The  Metelli  rules  for  perceptual  transparency  predict  the  color  and 
transparency value of the central band as a function of the relationship of the 
actual reflectance values of the tiles in the intermediate columns composing 
it (q and p) of each checkerboard with adjacent tiles (in columns b and a, 
respectively). If both values are lighter than those of the respective adjacent 
tiles, then the transparent band will be seen as having the lightest color in 
the scene (leftmost board). If they are both darker, then the transparent band 
has the darkest color (rightmost board). If one of the values of the central 
column is darker than that the adjacent tile, and the other is lighter, then the 
band will have an intermediate color (middle board). 
Physical transparent filters act as in the rightmost board; they preserve 
the contrast of the tiles in the central area. Other cases of filters correspond 
to the leftmost and central board (an instance would be opaline glass, for 
instance). However, the central area appears, in those cases, less transparent 
than the one in the rightmost board. 
The  Metelli  rules  give  values  for  color  attribution  once  order  is 
specified  (given  that  figural  conditions  are  respected).  However,  three-
dimensional  order  is  not  specified.  In  the  above  figure  we  see  that  the 
transparent band is  above  the board; but how do we get this impression? 
Why don’t we see a transparent checkerboard above an opaque band? The 
Metelli  rules  are  unable  to  provide  an  answer  because  they  work  only 
“horizontally” as if it were. The Adelson Anandan Anderson (AAA) rules 
provide order by examining what happens at an x-junction. Kitaoka (2005) 
nicely summarizes them graphically in the following way.
b   q   p    a b   q   p    a b   q   p    a
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Fig. 2 The AAA ordering rules according to Kitaoka (2005).
The arrows flow from the darker to the lighter of two adjacent surfaces. 
In (a) the three-dimensional order is unique: we see a transparent grey band 
over a darker band but we cannot see a transparent dark band over a light 
grey band. When crossing the x-junction (consider the four tiles in the top 
right corner) contrast polarity is preserved along the horizontal (both tiles 
are  darker  than  their  adjacent  tiles),  but  is  inverted  along  the  vertical 
boundary (one tile is darker, the other is lighter than its adjacent tile). In (b) 
order is not specified; we may as well perceive a white transparent band 
over a black band and conversely. Contrast polarity is preserved along both 
boundaries across the x-junction. In (c)  no transparency is seen; contrast 
polarity changes along both boundaries.1
From  the  above  analysis  it  follows  that  the  key  feature  of  visual 
transparency is that one and the same area in the visual mosaic is labeled 
with two different properties, i.e. two different shades of color; which are 
then seen  as  separated in  space  (as  one band is  seen  above the  other  – 
although it may not be specified which one). The color of the relevant tile of 
the mosaic is such that part of it can be attributed to the underlying band and 
part to the overlaid band. 
For this ‘color split’ to occur, it is prima facie – based on the idea that 
the transparent layer behaves like a filter – requested that the overlaid band 
darkens the bottom band as much as it darkens the background. However, as 
we have seen, other conditions apply that block the possibility to consider 
the impression of transparency as the simple superposition of filters (i.e., 
filters whose combined action is a form of subtractive color synthesis). 
In  particular,  see-through  patterns  are  produced  also  when  the 
differences in the background contrasts, albeit preserved, are attenuated, as 
1 Kitaoka  2005  further  enriches  the  issue  by  distinguishing  object  and  layer 
transparency;  for  instance  in  the  leftmost  Metelli  checkerboard  one  may see  two dark 
transparent vertical stripes over a light checkerboard. We shall not delve into this latter 
interpretation here.
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in  the  two  left  patterns  in  fig.  1.  These  configurations  correspond  to 
ecological  situations in  which it  is  possible  to  see through semi-opaque, 
translucid materials,  such as alabaster;  or  through a white,  finely woven 
fabric, such as the one some stockings are made of. At this point we turn to 
the issue of what it is for a white surface to be visually transparent. 
Can white be transparent?
Wittgenstein  (1977  3:  189)  argued  that  different  color  concepts 
entertain different relations with the notion of transparency. In particular, he 
claimed that whereas it is possible that red be transparent, there cannot be 
transparent white. In Casati 1989 I argued that an explanation of the alleged 
incompatibility  of  whiteness  and  transparency  is  available  on  purely 
phenomenological  grounds.  Whiteness  and  transparency  would  be 
incompatible because white does not support degrees of brightness. If the 
tiled area – the part of the mosaic which is the vehicle for transparency – is 
to replicate the see-through contrast, then it must be such as to allow for 
degrees of brightness. This is possible for all colors that are between white 
and black (there is a dark red and a light red, a dark grey and a light gray), 
but not for white and black itself: white and black are the extreme points of 
the brightness spectrum, and as points they have no internal complexity. In 
the  light  of  the  discussion  of  the  Metelli  rules  above  it  is  possible  to 
reconsider  that  suggestion by making the hypothesis  that  two notions  of 
transparency are at work,  clear transparency (the one that uniformly dims 
the  contrast  in  the  background)  and  the  somewhat  oxymoron  opaque 
transparency  (the  one  that  uniformly  lightens  the  contrast  in  the 
background). Transparent white would then be possible only in the opaque 
sense of transparency.
However, it is also possible to simply dismiss the suggestion by saying 
that in order for something to appear white, it needs not be uniform white or 
be  presented  by  a  uniformly  white  vehicle.  The  depiction  of  a  wrapped 
handkerchief  may  well  be  rendered  through  a  vast  array  of  grey  spots. 
Hence  if  white  cannot  be  transparent,  it  is  not  because  it  cannot  be  the 
vehicle of transparency simpliciter (it can) but because we want it to be the 
vehicle  of  transparency in  a  very  specific  sense,  the  sense  in  which  all 
components  of  the  vehicles,  taken  individually,  are  white.  In  a  mosaic 
conception of perception, one may want to say, all tiles of a white object are 
taken to be individually white. But there are reasons to deny a mosaic view. 
Visual  transparency  and  the  transparency  of 
shadows
There  are  two important  consequences  of  the  perceptual  account  of 
visual transparency for the question of the visual transparency of shadows. 
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First,  if  shadows  are  to  be  seen  as  transparent,  and  if  transparency  is 
conveyed by  x-junctions,  then  shadows they  have  to  straddle  luminance 
boundaries. The only shadows, if any, that can be seen as transparent are the 
ones which are cast on tiles, surface discontinuities, etc. 
Second, the fact  that  the impression of transparency is  conveyed by 
conditions in which light is not only subtracted, but also added, marks a 
distinction with the ecological, normal case of shadows. Indeed, the shaded 
area  is  always  dimmed  relative  to  the  surrounding.  An  immediate 
consequence of this is that the only type of transparent material that could 
be used to imitate a shadow is a dark film. Research in visual perception 
appears to confirm this (Cavanagh, Leclerc 1989). Negatives of pictures, in 
which shadows and shaded areas are made lighter than their surroundings, 
are hard or impossible to parse – for instance, face recognition is severely 
impaired if it is to rely on ‘reversed’ shading – suggesting that ‘whitened’ 
shadows are  not  seen as such and retrieved for  reconstructing shape,  let 
alone being recognized as shadows.2
Finally,  shadows  cannot  be  represented  by  line  drawings  (Kennedy 
1974). Lines in drawings signal borders of occlusion or else discontinuities 
that may become occluding borders if the object were seen from a different 
angle. Luminance boundaries are neither, and if a shadow is depicted by 
depicting its outline not only the shadow is not recognized, the remainder of 
the scene is also made difficult to parse.
To what extent is shadow perception an instance 
of transparency perception?
As we have seen, the key feature of transparency is that one and the 
same  visual  region  ‘stands  for’  two  different  surfaces,  the  overlaid 
transparent  surface  and  the  underlying  surface  (limiting  the  case  to  two 
surfaces;  a  welcome  experiment  should  ascertain  how  many  distinct 
surfaces can be seen as superposed transparently). This entails that the color 
of the visually shaded area is seen as the consequence of the interaction of 
two distinct colors, those of the two surfaces. In other terms, the luminance 
value of the area is ‘split’ into two inferred reflectance values. The spatial 
location of the visually shared area is also resolved with the attribution of 
two different distances from the observer: the transparent surface – in the 
case of unambiguous ordering – is seen above the background surface (in 
the bistable ordering one of the two surfaces is indifferently seen above or 
2 However, the stimuli for the Cavanagh experiments are mainly shadows that do not  
straddle reflectance boundaries. A welcome experiment could determine whether stimuli in 
which the non-subtractive conditions for transparency are associated to a candidate area for 
a shadow allow shadow recognition, thereby trumping the lightness-dimming condition of a 
shadow. For instance, a false shadow – cast on a checkerboard – which is transparent and 
lighter than the surrounding.
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behind the other). Let us consider how these two factors (color and location) 
could transpose in the perception of shadows. 
Shadow can only conform to the Metelli  rule that correspond to the 
clear filter (the rightmost checkerboard in fig. 1, which can indeed be seen 
both  as  a  dark  superposed  film-like  layer,  and  as  a  shadow cast  on  the 
board).3 Symmetrically,  a  spot  of  light  will  conform  to  the  rule  for 
transparency in the leftmost checkerboard in fig…, which can indeed be 
seen both as a white superposed layer, and as an intense spot of light on a 
black-and-grey checkerboard. Neither a shadow interpretation nor a spot-of-
light interpretation is however available for the middle checkerboard. The 
Metelli rules can account for these three phenomena in a simple way. First, 
the dark filter/shadow interpretation in the rightmost board is grounded in 
the fact  that  both  tiles  q  and  p are  darker  than their  neighbors  b  and  a 
respectively.  Symmetrically,  the  spot  of  light/white  transparent  layer 
interpretation in the leftmost board is grounded in the fact that both tiles q 
and p are lighter than their  neighbors b and a respectively.  However, no 
lightspot and no shadow can behave in such a way as to produce the results 
of the middle checkerboard: for here the central  tile q is  lighter than its 
neighbor  b,  whereas  central  tile  p  is  darker  than  its  neighbor  a.  The 
particular  distribution  of  luminances  of  tiles  cannot  be  explained  as  the 
result of a single agent (a shadow, or a spotlight) because shadows cannot 
both darken and lighten (they can only darken) and spotlights cannot either 
(they can only lighten). 
Compliance with the relevant Metelli rule is only a necessary condition 
for perceiving a shadow; other elements should be factored in for delivering 
the shadow appearance.  
Arnheim  (1974)  argued  that  the  phenomenology  of  cast  shadows 
perception is an instance of transparency. 
“I look at the small wooden barrel on the shelf. Its cylindrical surface displays 
a rich scale of brightness and colour values… But this description is correct only as 
long as I examine the surface inch by inch, or better, if I scan it through a small hole 
in a piece of paper. When I look at the barrel more freely and naturally, the result is 
quite different. Now the whole object looks uniformly brown. On the one side it is 
3 This is another sense in which shadows can be said to be transparent: 
they are not opaque; they act as clear filters.
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overlaid with a  film of  darkness,  which thins  out  and disappears  while  an even 
thicker layer of brightness begins to replace it. Over most of its surface the barrel 
shows a double value of brightness and colour, one belonging to the object itself and 
another, as it were, draped over ita transparency effect. This happens even though 
the eye receives one unitary stimulation from each point of the object. Perceptually, 
the unit is split up into the two layers. Here is a phenomenon that requires a name. 
The bottom layer will be called the object brightness and object colour of the barrel. 
The  top  layer  is  the  illumination.  Just  ad  in  central  perspective  a  system  of 
convergence is imposed upon a setting of shapes,  illumination is the perceivable 
imposition of a light gradient upon the object brightness and object colours in the 
setting.  The  superposition  observed  on  the  surface  of  illuminated  things  is… a 
transparency effect.” (p. 309-310). 
The  idea  that  shadows  are  a  sort  of  transparent  layer  is  apparently 
indirectly endorsed by Adelson and Anandan: 
“Many  physical  phenomena  can  produce  transparency.  For  example,  dark 
filters, specular reflections, puffs of smoke, gauze curtains, and cast shadows, all 
combine with patterns behind them in a transparent manner.” (Adelson and Anandan 
1990, p. 77).
However, the description grounding Arnheim’s idea that shadows are 
transparent  can  be  questioned.  Transparency  requires  (at  least)  the 
impression  of  two (or  many  such)  surfaces’ being  seen,  a  background 
surface and a superposed  surface (or many such). Illumination differs from 
transparency because there is only a background (object) surface to be seen, 
even though painters actually can reproduce illumination by superposition 
of transparent layers, as Arnheim correctly points out. In the case of a cast 
shadow, the separation in space is not available to account for the luminance 
split. Capitalizing on the discussion so far: in order to perceive a certain area 
as  a  shadow,  x-junctions  are  not  requested  as  they  are  in  the  case  of 
transparency. (At the same time, a lone shadow, one which cannot be easily 
traced back to an obtruder casting it, may be hard to perceive as a shadow – 
it is in this case that blurred boundaries can help.). This means that shadows 
can  be  seen  as  shadows even  though  they  do  not  straddle  a  luminance 
boundary; but straddling a boundary is requested for a transparent surface to 
be perceived. Hence the general case of shadows’ being transparent is not 
viable. The door is still open to evaluate whether shadows that do straddle a 
boundary are perceived as transparent. But a general case cannot be made 
that a shadow float above, or is not in touch with, the surface it is cast upon. 
It is not a film-like area superposed to the object. The separation between 
background  surface  and  transparent  layer  that  exsists  in  the  case  of 
transparency, if it is to exist in the shadow case, must of a different kind. 
Space occupation is  jealous,  at  least  relative to  some contexts.  Two 
entities  of  the  same kind  –  two  apples,  or  more  generally  two material 
objects – cannot occupy the same spatial region at the same time. Events 
seem to arouse less jealousy: the rotation of the sphere and its warming up 
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at the same time are  co-located (Davidson 1969).  Auditory perception is 
tolerant towards co-location. Chords are heard as complex entities whose 
components are heard as co-located. It is also generally recognized that two 
entities of a different kind can occupy the same region of space: a statue and 
the portion of marble it is made of – if you agree on the fact that the statue is 
not, or is not just, the portion of marble; a hole and the screw in it, if you 
agree  that  the  hole  is  a  full-fledged  spatial  entity.  A three-dimensional 
shadow can be made coincide with a hole. It may even be argued that a body 
coincides  with  the  shadow  created  by  its  outer  surface.  However,  the 
separation of shadow and surface is not to be thought along the model of the 
separation  of  spatially  coincident  shadow and  hole;  after  all,  it  is  even 
conceivable  that  two  different  shadows,  artfully  cast  from two  different 
objects, coincide in space. 
To take stock: Where is then the cast shadow? On the face of it, it is not 
laid  over the surface it is cast upon. But it is not spatially unrelated to the 
surface either (there is a sense in which it is ‘there’ – and it surely isn’t 
somewhere  else). We can think of three lines of answer to the question. A 
radical, eliminativist solution to the issue is to consider that there are no 
shadows after  all,  only areas that are (more or less)  shaded. A different, 
straightforward if counterintuitive resolution of the issue is to consider that 
the shadow literally is in the surface. This is tantamount to saying that there 
is a level of visual representation in which objects are represented as ideal 
volumes of space, provided with ideal two-dimensional surfaces, and that 
surfaces  are  penetrable  and  can  spatially  coincide  with  other  surfaces. 
Finally, one can simply say that shadow location is specified only up to a 
point. The visual concept of a shadow indicates in two-dimensions where 
the shadow is on a surface (its superficial address, as if it  were) without 
indicating its three-dimensional relationship to the surface. 
None of the above revisionary accounts supports shadow transparency, 
as  the  latter  requires  the  presence  of  two,  spatially  distinct  layers. 
Eliminativism gets rid of the shadow altogether, thereby disposing of the 
bearer of transparency. The idealized volume view forces the shadow into 
the surface; and the indeterminate location account prevents it from being 
anywhere in three-dimension relative to the surface; either way, the shadow 
cannot  be  above  the  surface,  as  is  requested  by  the  conditions  for 
transparency.  
An intriguing complication is provided by partly coincident shadows, 
typically  cast  by  two  different  objects  and  two  different  light  sources. 
Consider  again  what  would  happen  in  the  case  of  the  superposition  of 
transparent filters. 
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Fig. 3: Partly coincident shadows.
Polarity-wise, we are here in a case similar to that of fig. 2b, except that 
the  shaded  area  is  always  dimmer  than  the  background.  Polarity  is  not 
changed across the boundary, and the result is bistable transparency: either 
strip can be seen ‘through’ the other. If we turn to shadows, we have three 
possibilities.  In  the  eliminativist  account,  there  are  only  areas  that  are 
shaded relative to one light source (such as the arms of the cross) or relative 
to two light  sources (such as the central  area).  The ideal  object  account 
forces  both  shadows  into  the  surface  of  the  object.  The  indeterminate 
location account deprives of  content  the issue of  shadow location in  the 
third  dimension.  Once  more,  none  of  the  three  accounts  supports 
transparency;  it  is  then  to  be  ascertained,  by  empirical  means,  whether 
patterns such as the one in fig. 3 is perceived as a case of transparency when 
shadows are involved. In this respect it is important to observe that in the 
shadow case the x-junction concerns  boundaries  that  exclusively depend 
upon illumination. The empirical hypothesis is then that whenever the visual 
system  is  able  to  establish  that  the  x-junction  concerns  illumination 
boundaries  (and  no  reflectance  boundary  is  involved)  no  sense  of 
transparency is conveyed by the image.
The  above  discussion  points  towards  the  following  conclusion.  The 
concept  of  transparency  is  multiply  ambiguous,  and  has  an  internal 
complexity that requires a lot  of careful inspection to unearth. So is,  for 
close reasons, the concept of a shadow. Both concepts have a visual side and 
a causal side, and the interaction between the two sides become problematic 
when spatial features come into play.
I shall close my discussion by presenting two side issues. 
Are shadows colored?
We  asked  whether  shadows  are  transparent.  A  cognate  question 
concerns the color of the shadow. Is it grey? Admittedly, some shadows are 
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darker  than  others.  And  shadows  of  non-colored  light  are  not  colored 
(colored  shadows usually  result  from the  concurrence  of  two differently 
colored lights, so that the shaded area receives only one type of light, which 
thus colors  the shadow).  According to  Mizrahi  (2002:  186ff.)  a  pictorial 
conception of shadows informs our response to the question about the color 
of a shadow. A shadow cast on a white surface is called ‘grey’ because grey 
is  the  color  we  would  use  to  depict  it.  In  itself,  Mizrahi  argues,  this 
particular shadow is white as the surface is white; it would be yellow had 
the surface been yellow. However, the pictorial conception of shadows may 
not be available to the untutored. Not only that; we may not want to call 
‘yellow’ a shadow cast on a yellow surface. Indeed, by so doing, we would 
neglect  the shadow’s contribution to the luminance value of  the surface. 
Instead, it looks as if the visual system attributes to the shadow a grey value 
that results from a calculation of the quantity of light that is prevented from 
reaching the surface, relative to a normalized white value. Thus, it is not at 
all unjustified to say that shadows are grey.
Making transparent and making visible
Our discussion of the relationships between shadows and transparency 
have relied on the “see-through” sense of transparency. In yet another sense, 
one may say that to be transparent is to make visible. Shadows can then be 
construed,  in  some  circumstances,  as  transparency-makers.  In  bright 
sunlight is may be impossible to read a white sheet of paper covered with 
grey writing;  the  writing  texture may however  become visible  only if  a 
shadow  is  cast  on  the  sheet  (this  fact  was  pointed  out  to  me  by 
J.M.Kennedy).  The  shadow here  is  like  a  transparent  hole  in  an opaque 
surface, beyond which features of an underlying surface are revealed. In a 
sense, if white cannot be transparent, it turns out that black is the absolutely 
transparent color, the one that offers no resistance to the sight.
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